

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 AS-01 NSCE-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1288

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0544

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION 3 - EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS

REF: USNATO 6198 (DTG 141428Z NOV 75)

1. WE BELIEVE THAT US SHOULD NOW MOVE TO OBTAIN ALLIED
CONSENSUS ON REMAINING OPEN OPTION 3 ISSUES IN TIME FOR
WEST TO PUT FORWARD OPTION 3 PROPOSAL BY THE END OF THIS
NEGOTIATING ROUND. REFTEL REPORTS THAT
MOST ALLIES STILL FAVOR EARLY NEGATIVE REPLY TO EASTERN
QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THERE WILL BE LIMITATIONS ON NON-
US ALLIED EQUIPMENT. THIS INDICATES THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO
GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO US VIEWS ON THIS POINT.

2. IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONSIDER THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
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ALLIED PREFERENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO

PUT FORWARD OPTION 3 NOW, THEN IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER SUCH A COMPROMISE. THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE, HOWEVER, AS A FINAL AND DECISIVE US CONCESSION IN RETURN FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINDER OF THE NATO OPTION 3 PAPERS AND ONLY IF THE US HAS DECIDED TO PUT FORWARD OPTION 3 PRIOR TO THE CHRISTMAS RECESS OF THE VIENNA TALKS. THIS IS BECAUSE THIS COMPROMISE WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF PUTTING THE ALLIED ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS ISSUE INTO THE FOREFRONT OF EAST-WEST DISCUSSION BEFORE THE EAST HAS TAKEN A POSITION OF SUBSTANCE ON THE AUGMENTED ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

3. IF WASHINGTON DECIDES TO PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE, THEN WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING REWORDING OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE GUIDANCE PAPER, WITH INDIVIDUAL SENTENCES NUMBERED FOR CONVENIENCE. BEGIN TEXT:

A. AS NECESSARY TO MEET EASTERN PRESSURE, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATIONS ONLY AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. NO CHANGE FROM EXISTING PARA 5)

B. THEY SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO GO INTO DETAIL ON THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE UNTIL THEY HAVE RECEIVED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE AS TO WHETHER THE EAST IS WILLING TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. (FROM PARA 5- WITH INSERTION OF "INTO DETAIL" INSTEAD OF "IN ANY WAY.")

C. THEY SHOULD ADD THAT IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THE NATO OFFER CONCERNS EXCLUSIVELY THAT PORTION OF THE US EQUIPMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH IS SPECIFIED AND THAT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE ALLIED OFFER. (FROM PARA 5, LEAD-IN PHRASE ADDED).

D. IF THE EAST CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR DETAILS ON LIMITATIONS AND, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, A FURTHER CLARIFYING STATEMENT ON THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN OBTAINING AN INITIAL INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MAY STATE THAT:
(NEW LANGUAGE):

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(I) THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN US ARMAMENTS INCLUDES IMPLICITLY A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON THESE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS. (NEW LANGUAGE).

(II) REDUCTION OF NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE WESTERN OFFER AND LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. (DRAWN FROM PARAS

5 AND 10).

(III) ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DECLINE TO GO ANY FURTHER IN DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS UNTIL AFTER AN INITIAL INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE ON THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL. (NEW LANGUAGE).

4. THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS FORMULATION ARE THAT:

A. IT WOULD SATISFY THE ALLIED DESIRE TO MAKE THEIR POINT DURING EARLY DISCUSSION OF THE OPTION 3 PROPOSAL (I.E., BEFORE RECEIPT OF A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE) THAT THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED ARMAMENTS.

B. IT WOULD INDICATE THAT US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WOULD BE LIMITED, THUS COUNTERBALANCING TO SOME EXTENT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE EAST OF WESTERN REJECTION OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE ALLIES.

C. THIS LANGUAGE WOULD NOT PRECLUDE A LATER WESTERN PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF LIMITATION ON ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IF THE US DECIDES ON THIS.

5. A SECOND ALTERNATIVE, WHICH WE RECOMMEND AGAINST, WOULD BE TO AGREE TO THE FRG PROPOSAL TO MOVE PARA 10. THE RESULTING UNBALANCED PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS WOULD INTENSIFY THE RISK OF AN EASTERN RESPONSE WHICH FOCUSES NEARLY EXCLUSIVELY ON THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE. THE POINT THAT THE US IS WILLING TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN OF ITS NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA WOULD BE MADE ONLY INDIRECTLY, BY IMPLICATION (THAT IS, THROUGH TELLING THE EAST THAT THE NON-US ALLIES WERE
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NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT SUCH LIMITATIONS). IF THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE IS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE EAST AT ALL BEFORE ASKING FOR AN INITIAL INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE, THEN THE WESTERN POSITION ON ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS PRESENTED SHOULD HAVE SOME BALANCE: I.E., THE "NEGATIVE" POINT THAT THE ALLIES ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE BALANCED BY A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE "POSITIVE" POINT THAT THE US IS WILLING.RESOR

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